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I. INTRODUCTION

Unelected heads of city departments and agencies, who are in other respects (as democratic theory requires) subject to the control of the people, must, where special protection for homosexuals are [sic] concerned,
be permitted to do what they please.
In Romerv. Evans,2 the Supreme Court held that Amendment 2 to
the Colorado constitution violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Amendment 2 repealed then-existing
ordinances in Colorado municipalities that afforded civil rights protection to individuals who face discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.' In addition to invalidating existing legal protections
for gays, lesbians, and bisexuals, Amendment 2 prohibited any state
or local governmental entity from enacting legislation or regulations
that would give gays, lesbians, and bisexuals a "protected status or
claim of discrimination."4 The Court, with three Justices dissenting,'
found that Amendment 2 "impos[ed] a broad and undifferentiated
disability on a single named group" and "seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class that it affects." 6 Based on these
two findings, the Court concluded that Amendment 2 lacked a ra* Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. BA., University of Pennsylvania; J.D., Yale Law School. I would like to thank the editors of the University of Pennsylvania
Journal of Constitutional Law for inviting me to participate in the inauguration of this legal periodical.
Equality Foundation v. City of Cincinnati, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996) (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
3 See id. at 1623.
4 1& (citing COLO. CONST., Art. II, § 30). The infirm amendment provided that

Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its
agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the
basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status,
quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.
COLO. CONsr., Art. II, § 30.
5Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomasjoined. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
6 1& at 1627.

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[V/ol. 1: 1

tional relationship to a legitimate state interest and was thus unconstitutional.7 Although the Court declined to apply heightened scrutiny to the amendment, many gay and lesbian civil rights activists and
legal scholars hailed the decision as a sign of greater tolerance for
gay and lesbian legal equality by the Court.8 Those who praised the
Court particularly noted the contrast between the tone of the Romer
decision and the widely criticized opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick,9 in
which the Court rejected a constitutional challenge to Georgia's
sodomy statute.
Despite the apparent sensitivity the Romer majority displayed toward gay rights, the dissenting opinion demonstrates that at least
three Justices of the Court will not approach future civil rights actions on behalf of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered individuals with the level of compassion desired by those who support
gay and lesbian equality. For instance, in his dissent in Romer,Justice
Scalia charged that the majority opinion "has no foundation in
American constitutional law, and barely pretends to,""0 and that by
finding Amendment 2 unconstitutional, the opinion "places the
prestige of [the Court] behind the proposition that opposition to
homosexuality is as reprehensible as racial or religious bias."" Scalia
also contended that the Bowers decision effectively bars any argument
that "homosexuality cannot be singled out for disfavorable treatment." 2 Thus, Scalia would certainly reject arguments that sexual
identity classifications should trigger heightened scrutiny.
Scalia
7 See id. at 1623.
8

See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Gay Rights Laws Can't Be Banned, High Court Rules, N.Y. TiMES,

May 21, 1996, at Al ([Romer marked] "a historic shift in the Court's response to anti-gay discrimination.") (quoting Suzanne B. Goldberg of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund).
9 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (finding no due process violation in the criminalization
of "homosexual sodomy"). The Bowers Court was particularly criticized for framing the right at issue in the
case in extremely narrow terms. Rather than considering whether the criminalization of adult,
consensual sexual conduct without compelling societal interests contradicted traditional notions
of fundamental justice, the Court instead searched the common law for a right to engage in
"homosexual sodomy." Finding none, it ruled that the Georgia statute did not violate due process. In fact, the Court explicitly rejected attempts to place homosexual sexual conduct within a
broader sphere of permissible sexual conduct. Instead, the Court likened homosexual activity
to "adultery, incest, and other sexual crimes," id. at 195-96, which much of society deems distasteful. The Court, however, failed to distinguish heterosexualsexual activity from these other
forms of sexual conduct.
10 Romer v. Evans, 116S. Ct. 1620, 1636
(1996).
1 Id. at 1629. Because the Court analyzed Amendment 2 under a rational basis test, it never
determined that sexuality classifications demand the same type of scrutiny as racial and religious
distinctions.
12

Id.

is By relying on Bowers as a bar to equal protection for gays and lesbians, Scalia's argument
reduces gay and lesbian experience simply to the practice of illegal sodomitic acts. Scalia also
ignores the distinct purposes of due process and equal protection. Several legal scholars have
convincingly argued that the Bowers decision should not preclude protection for gays and lesbians under Equal Protection principles. These scholars point to the differences in the Due Proc-
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concludes that Amendment 2 "[was] a modest attempt by seemingly
tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores against the
efforts of a politically gowerful minority to revise those mores
through use of the laws."
I explore the contrasting views of the members of the Romer
Court not as a prelude to a more extensive analysis of the legal issues
in that case, but rather to highlight the divisive and often politicized
nature - both historically and contemporaneously - of attempts to
address gay and lesbian inequality through civil rights litigation. ' 5 A
number of commentators have argued that legal theory is often (or
always) "indeterminate" and that judicial decision-making on highly
contested social issues such as sexual oppression, racial hierarchy,
and heterosexism may often reflect the personal views and the privileged social position of jurists and reinforce social inequality.' 6 Perhaps there is a hint of postmodernism in Scalia's concluding com-

ess Clause, under which Bowers was decided, and the suspect class prong of equal protection jurisprudence. The former principle guards against encroachments to fundamental rights, while
the latter protects despised minorities. See Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constituton. A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protertion, 55 U. CiHi. L REv. 1161
(1988). Thus, while the criminalization of homosexual sodomy, narrowly stated, may not violate
notions of fundamental fairness, the oppression of the class of gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered persons by the state may violate notions of equality guarded by the Equal Protection
Clause. This reasoning, however, opens up a dangerous conduct-status distinction which ignores the role of sexual conduct in constructing sexual identity.
14 Roner 116 S. Ct. at 1629. Scalia also claims that "those who engage in homosexual
conduct tend to... have high disposable income... [and] they possess political power much
greater than their numbers." Id at 1634. Scalia's characterization of gays, lesbians, bisexuals
and t-ansgendered individuals as "politically powerful" suggests that at least three currentJustices would disagree with any argument that classifications based on sexual orientation are 'suspect" under an Equal Protection analysis. At least one circuit court has declined to treat sexual
orientation as a suspect classification for this reason. See High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial
Security Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574 (9th Cir.), retearingdeniei 909 F.2d 375 (1990)
("[H]omosexuals are not without political power, they have the ability to and do 'attract the
attention of lawmakers' . .. .") (citation omitted). In a previous article, I criticized the argument that gays and lesbians are "wealthy" and "powerful" by observing that persons who advance
such claims typically rely on misleading, but well-published statistics purporting to document gay
and lesbian wealth. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yd Unseen: A Racial Critiqueof Goy and
Lesbian Legal Theory and PolitialDiscoure 29 CONN. L REV. 561, 605-8 (1997) [hereinafter Out
Yet Unseen]. These statistics inflate gay and lesbian wealth because they represent a "biased"
sample of the gay and lesbian community. Notably, many of the surveys on gay income are
based on the incomes of magazine subscribers, members of political organizations, white men.
urbanites, and "out" gays and lesbians. The first three of these populations tend to have higher
income levels--regardess of sexal orientation. See id. The latter group has higher income
levels because wealth helps insulate against the detrimental effects of coming out" See id.
For an excellent discussion of the history of gay and lesbian civil rights litigation, see
Patricia A. Cain, LitigatingforLesbian and Gay Rights A Legal History, 79 VA L REV. 1551 (1993).
16 Critical legal scholars, critical race theorists, and feminist legal theorists have written extensively on this issue in contemporary jurisprudence. Nevertheless, the early legal realism"
movement served as the precursor to postmodernist claims of contemporary critics regarding
the law's indeterminacy and its role in replicating social oppression. Set generally GARY MINDA.
POSrMODERN LEGAL MOVEmEmrs: L4.W ANDJURISPRUDENCE AT CENrURV S END (1995).
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ments in Romer in which he asserts that by invalidating Amendment
2, the Court has committed an "act ...not of judicial judgment, but
of political wilL" 17 Yet one could (quite persuasively) make a similar

claim about Scalia's own reasoning and conclude that his dissent in
Romer reflects his personal "political" judgments regarding how "reprehensible" (or not) he believes the marginalized status of gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgendered individuals is in our society.
Consider Scalia's dissent, again joined by Justices Rehnquist and
Thomas, in the Court's decision to vacate and remand a judgment
rendered by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Equality Foundation
v. City of Cincinnati.8 The Equality Foundationcases involve a constitutional challenge to a Cincinnati ordinance which, like Amendment
2, prohibits that city from classifying sexual orientation as a protected status in its civil rights laws. The language of the challenged
ordinance tracks almost exactly the text of Amendment 2.0 In a previous ruling the Sixth Circuit held that the ordinance was constitutional, but the Supreme Court remanded this ruling so that the
court of appeals could reconsider the case in light of Romer.2'
Despite the striking similarities between the Cincinnati ordinance
and Amendment 2, the Sixth Circuit, on remand, recently upheld
the regulation on the ground (in part) that Romer involved a "statewide" prohibition of civil rights protections for gays, lesbians and bisexuals, while the Cincinnati ordinance limits just one city.n This
unprincipled "distinction" will likely not survive further judicial review. When the case was initially before the Supreme Court, Scalia
offered an argument that was even more sweeping in its disregard for
gay and lesbian equality; he reasoned that "where special protection"
for gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and the transgendered is at issue, government officials "must... be permitted to do what they please.,23 This
conclusion provides an additional "preview" of his position on
whether gays and lesbians constitute a suspect class for Equal Protection purposes.

17Romerv. Evans, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 1636 (emphasis
added).
18 Equality Foundation v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995),
vacated, 116 S.Ct.

2519 (1996) [Equality)], 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997) [Equality II].
19Id.
20 It provides that:
The City of Cincinnati and its various Boards and Commissions may not enact, adopt, enforce or administer any ordinance, regulation, rule or policy which provides that homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, status, conduct, or relationship constitutes, entities, or otherwise provides a person with the basis to have any claim of minority or
protected status, quota preference or other preferential treatment.
Equality II, 128 F.3d at 291.
See Equality I, 116 S. Ct. at 2519.
See Equality I, 128 F.3d at 298-300.
Equality I, 116 S.Ct. at 2519 (emphasis added).
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Because Romer has preempted political/legal attempts (with the
possible exception of the pending Equality Foundationlitigation) to
preclude gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgendered individuals
from seeking civil rights protection in the "political" process, it is
likely that future litigation in the area of "gay rights" will focus on
traditional issues of state- and private-sponsored discrimination.
Currently, the United States military ban against "openly" gay and
lesbian troops and prohibitions of same-sex marriage dominate gay
and lesbian civil rights litigation. A plurality of reasons explain the
centrality of these issues in gay and lesbian politics and civil rights efforts. First, these issues reflect highly symbolic, sometimes material,
and uniquely public forms of discrimination against gay and lesbian
individuals. In addition, at least one of these issues - same-sex marriage - reinforces middle and upper class family structures and thus
has the support of white and wealthy members of the gay and lesbian
community who often define and direct gay civil rights strategy. Furthermore, the anti-racist civil rights movement has helped to cultivate a legal culture that demands formal legal equality. As a result,
gay and lesbian civil rights activists, in focusing on public forms of
discrimination, have borrowed heavily from anti-racist civil rights
strategies - even analogizing racism to homophobia - in order to
advance claims of gay and lesbian equality before courts.z
An important component of the contemporary gay and lesbian
civil rights strategy, inparticular the military cases, has been the reliance on civil rights law as a vehicle for remedying and preventing the
discrimination faced by gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgendered
persons who "come out" - or who publicly reveal and construct"
their socially despised sexual orientation. The coming out process
has tremendous cultural and political significance in lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered communities." While "heterosexuals"
also reveal their sexual and affectional orientation to others, the
stigma attached to non-heterosexual sexual practice renders coming
out for "sexual others" a complex, delicate, threatening, and often
dangerous event. In addition, because the invisibility of "sexualized
others" hinders their collective political action for civil rights, com24 See Hutchinson, supra note 14 (discussing how the enormous attention paid to same-sex

marriage litigation reflects, to a large extent, the racial and class privileges of gay and lesbian
civil rights activists and legal theorists).
See generally Odeana R. Neal, The Limits of Legal Discourse: Learning Froin the Ciril Rights
Movement in the Questfor Gay and Lesbian CivilRights, 40 N.Y.L SmH. L RE%,. 679 (1996) (analyzing
this strategy).
26 See discussion infra Part IV.B.2. (describing coming out as a process of revelation and construction).
Black lesbian theoristJewelle Gomez states that "[t]he coming-out story has acted as a major unifying thread in a lesbian/gay community that is as diverse as the United States itself."
JEWELLE GOMEZ, Beause Silence Is Cost4, in FORTY-THREE SEPTEMBERS 167, 169 (1993).
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ing out is often considered an important - indeed necessary -political goal.28 Furthermore, because the "closet" exacts such a costly
psychological and emotional burden on sexual others, coming out
may have a cathartic and psychologically beneficial effect on the individual.29 These important cultural, political, and emotional dimensions of the coming out process have placed it - or at least gay and
lesbian visibility - at the center of gay and lesbian civil rights litigation. In one case, Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group of Boston [Hurley]," the issue of gay and lesbian outness
reached the Supreme Court for the first time. In Hurley, the Court
ruled that the application of Massachusetts' public accommodations
law, so as to require the organizers of the Boston St. Patrick's Day Parade to include a contingent of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals as a parade unit, infringed the free speech rights of the parade organizers."
The state courts treated the parade as a "place of public accommodation" and, applying the doctrine set forth in the Court's Roberts trilogy,32 found that application of the statute did not infringe the organizers' right of expressive association because the parade did not
have a particularized message.3 In a unanimous opinion, however,
the Supreme Court departed from the public accommodations
analysis and instead ruled that the parade itself and participation in
the parade were forms of protected speech. As a result, the Court
concluded that by compelling the organizers to accommodate GLIB
(Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, the group seeking access to the parade), the state would alter the message - albeit
amorphous - of the parade, thereby infringing defendant's free
speech rights.-" By treating the parade and GLIB's participation in it
as speech, the Court was able to avoid balancing the parade organizers' possible speech interests against the state's and GLIB's interest
in gay and lesbian equality. The Hurley decision ended years of political and legal efforts by the group to participate in the parade.
As the first Supreme Court decision to decide an issue of sexual
orientation discrimination under a state public accommodations
statute, the Hurley decision will likely play a crucial role in determining the outcome of future litigation involving outness, and its reach
See discussion infra Part IV.B.3.
See id.
s 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
" See id. at 566.
3 See New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S.
1 (1988); Board of Directors of
Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468
U.S. 609 (1984). Each of these cases involved a conflict between a civil rights statute and defendants' assertion of a right to discriminate, predicated upon the right of expressive association.
3 See Hurley, 515 U.S.
at 564.
See id. at 572-73.
28
29
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could likely extend well beyond the narrow context of parade participation. In this article I explore two important questions raised by
the Hurley decision. First, although the Supreme Court did not analyze the case under the Roberts framework, it suggested at the conclusion of the oinion that the case would have the same outcome under that test. The Court's dictum concerning the Roberts trilogy
thus raises the question whether Hurley indicates that the Court
might disturb the Roberts doctrine if presented with the opportunity.
Second, the Hurley Court, in rejecting GLIB's claim, found that the
parade organizers were not attempting to exclude gay and lesbian
participants as such, but rather merely did not want the plaintiff to
march in the parade as an organized unit with banners and other accouterments of parade participation." This finding contradicts the
state court's finding of fact that the exclusion of the unit amounted
to invidious discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation."" The
state court's rulings are plausible given the importance of outness
and open declarations of sexual orientation in the struggle for gay
and lesbian equality and in the construction of sexual identity. Because outness is intertwined with sexual identity, defendant's refusal
to allow GLIB to march openly in the parade constituted an attempt
to silence - or closet - non-heterosexual identity. Thus, even if the
outcome of Hurley were justifiable on the narrow grounds of free
speech, the Court's rejection of the lower court's finding of discrimination leaves open an important question for future cases involving gay and lesbian discrimination: that is, how will the Court
treat future discrimination cases that turn on expressive activity of
gays and lesbians, or, more precisely, will the Court resolve future
disputes over outness in a way that fosters gay and lesbian equality.
This article considers these questions in three parts. In Part H, I
discuss the legal and political history underlying the Hurley decision.
I will specifically analyze the free speech framework applied in the
Supreme Court opinion and contrast it with the Roberts test that governed the state courts' decisions. I will also discuss in greater detail
the two compelling questions the decision raises. Parts I and IV attempt to answer these questions. In Part III, I examine the possible
impact of Hurley upon the Roberts doctrine by analyzing how postHurley cases have treated speech and equality conflicts. I argue that
the courts in these cases have rightfully limited the reach of Hurley
and have preserved the balancing formula established in Roberts. In
Part IV, I consider the negative implications, from a gay-sensitive
perspective, that Hurley might have for cases involving discrimination
"See

Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557. 580

(1995).
35 See id.
at 572.
See id.at 563-64.
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on the basis of outness. Finally, I suggest a tentative approach for
courts to follow in order to ensure that civil rights law recognizes the
importance of outness and adequately protects gays, lesbians, and bisexuals from invidious discrimination.
II. OPENLY GAY, LESBIAN OR BISEXUAL?

NOT IN MY PARADE

A. Hurley: Politicaland ProceduralHistory
In Hurley, GLIB, a group of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals of Irish
descent, challenged the defendant's denial of its application to participate in Boston's St. Patrick's Day-Evacuation Day Parade, held
annually on March 17.' Every year since 1947, the City of Boston has
granted defendant, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council,
authorization to organize and conduct the parade.39 In 1992, GLIB
organized for the purpose of participating in the parade." In that
year, a history of contestation between GLIB and parade organizers
also began. When GLIB submitted an application to march in the
1992 parade, defendant rejected GLIB's application, ostensibly due
to "safety reasons and insufficient information regarding GLIB.""
Nevertheless, GLIB ultimately participated in the parade under a
court order that restricted the extent of its participation." In 1993,
GLIB again sought permission to march in the parade, but defendant denied the group's application arguing that its "decision to exclude groups with sexual themes merely formalized that the Parade
expresses traditional religious and social values."43
After the defendant denied GLIB's 1993 request to participate in
the parade, the group filed a lawsuit in state court alleging, inter alia,
that the defendant's decision to exclude it from the parade violated
the Massachusetts public accommodations law.44 The trial court first
considered whether defendant's exclusion of GLIB resulted from invidious discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The court
ruled that defendant's "inconsistent and changing explanations" for
its denial of GLIB's repeated applications demonstrated that these

"The parade honors "the feast of the apostle to Ireland... and... mark[s] the evacuation
of royal troops and Loyalists from [Boston]." Hurey, 515 U.S. at 560.
s9 See id.
40 See id. at
561.
41 Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group of Boston v. Boston, 636 N.E.2d 1293,
1295 (Mass. 1994) [Hurley 1] rev'd sub nom. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (internal quotation omitted).
42

See id.

43

Id.

44 See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group
of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 561

(1995). That statute prohibits discrimination on the basis of "sexual orientation ... in any place
of public accommodation .... " MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 272, § 98 (Law. Co-op. 1992).
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explanations were merely a pretext for discrimination and that GLIB
was excluded solely because of its members' sexual orientation.,5
The court then considered whether a parade, which is not explicitly mentioned in the statute, should be considered a place of public
accommodation. The court concluded that the parade constituted a
place of public accommodation, noting the parade's lack of selectivity and large size."6 Defendant in turn raised an "expressive association" defense to the application of the antidiscrimination statute.
This defense triggered an analysis of the Supreme Court's Roberts
trilogy, which establishes the framework for deciding whether the
application of an antidiscrimination statute violates the associational
rights of the discriminator.
B. Tie Roberts Doctrine
The conflict in Roberts began in 1974 when the Minneapolis chapter of the Jaycees began admitting women as "regular members," a
move that violated the national organization's bylaws.49 In 1975, the
St. Paul chapter joined Minneapolis in its defiance of the organiza-

tion's exclusionary policy. 4 9 When the president of the national or-

ganization threatened to revoke the membership of the two chapters, the chapters filed complaints with the Minnesota Department of
Human Rights alleging that the organization's bylaws violated the
Minnesota Human Rights Act. The Department of Human Rights
concluded that thejaycees is a place of public accommodation under Minnesota law. The Minnesota Supreme Court subsequently

Hurley I, 636 N.E.2d at 1295.
See id. at 1295-98. Although most state public accommodations statutes list the type of organizations that are considered places of public accommodations, many state courts have held
that these lists are not exhaustive and that the statutes should be liberally construed given their
remedial purposes. Se4 eg., i at 1297-98 ("The language of [the statute] and our case law require that the statute be given a broad and inclusive interpretation."). Furthermore, courts
commonly consider the following factors: large size, lack of selectivity, and recreational nature.
See, eg., National Org. for Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 127 N.J. Super. 522, 531 (App.
Div.), afd, 67 N.J. 320 (1974) (finding youth athletic organization a place of public accommodation due to its recreational, educational, and unselective nature).
47 Seelrish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston v. Boston, 636 N.E.2d 1293.
1298-1301 (Mass. 1994) [Hurley ].
4s Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 614 (1984). The bylaws established two
classes of individual membership: "associate" and "regular." Id. at 613. Regular membership
was limited to men between the ages of 18 and 35, and associate membership included all others (principally women and men outside of the age restriction). &,r id. Associate members
could not vote, hold national office, or participate in certain organizational leadership training
and awards programs. See id.
4 See id. at 614.
50 See id. The statute bans discrimination on the basis of sex in places of public accommodation. See id.
51 See id. at 615.
4
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affirmed the decision.52 Upon this record, the national organization
renewed an earlier federal action it had brought to enjoin enforcement of the public accommodations law.5 s The organization alleged
that enforcement of the law would infringe its members' rights of
"free speech and association."54 After a trial, the district court entered a judgment for the state officials, but a divided Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed that decision.5 The Eighth Circuit held that the organization's right to select its members was
protected by the First Amendment because "advocacy of political and
public causes.. . [was] not [an] insubstantial part" of its activities."
The appeals court also concluded that the inclusion of women as
regular members would produce a "direct and substantial" interference with the organization's expressive freedom because it would
change the group's "philosophical cast."5 7 Consequently, this ruling
placed the tension between expressive freedom and equality before
the Supreme Court, which granted plaintiff's petition for certiorari. 8
The Court linked the Jaycees' speech and associational interests
to two doctrinal roots. The first strand of precedent identified by the
Court maintains that an individual's "[choice] to enter into and
maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured
against undue intrusion by the State . .. . 9 The affiliations protected by this right of intimate association include marriage,' the raising and education of children,61 and cohabitation with one's relatives.62 This right "receives protection as a fundamental element of
personal liberty. " 6 The second body of doctrine recognizes a "right
of individuals to associate for the purpose of engaging in activities
protected by the First Amendment: speech, assembly, petition for

52 See id. at 616. This decision turned on the organization's provision of goods and services,
its unselective membership criteria, and its use of fixed and mobile sites for its various activities.
See id.(citing United StatesJaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 768-74 (1981)).
53 See id.The district court previously dismissed the suit
without prejudice to renew, in the
event of an adverse ruling against the Jaycees in the state administrative proceeding. See id.at
615.
Id. at 615. After the administrative proceeding concluded, theJaycees amended
its complaint to add a claim that the statute was "unconstitutionally vague and overbroad." Id. at 616.
55 United States Jaycees v. McClure, 534 F. Supp. 766
(1982), rev'd 709 F.2d 1560 (1983),
rev'd sub nom. Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
See United StatesJaycees, 709 F.2d at 1570.
5 Id. at 1571-72. The court also ruled that the Minnesota
public accommodations statute
was vague as construed and applied by the Minnesota Supreme Court. See id.at 1576-78.
See Douglas 0. Linder, Freedom of Association After Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
82 MIct. L.
REV. 1878, 1880 (1984).
5 Roberts, 468 U.S. at
617-18.
60 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
61 See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S.
816 (1977).
62 See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494 (1977).
a Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
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the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion."" As the
Court held, this freedom of expressive association is an "indispensable
means of preserving... individual [speech] liberties. "
The Court easily disposed of theJaycees' intimate association defense, noting the organization's large size and unselective membership criteria.66 The Jaycees' expressive association defense, however,
demanded a more nuanced analysis because the leadership organization clearly engaged in some expressive activides.67 Furthermore, the
Court concluded that state interference with the membership composition of an organization might impede the enjoyment of this second associational freedom. 6s Thus, application of the statute, which
would require the admission of women into the organization, implicated defendant's expressive associational rights.
Having located the particular associational right triggered by the
application of the public accommodations law, the Court proceeded
to consider whether that light was infringed in this case and to balance any infringement of that right against the state's interests in
equality and a society free of invidious discrimination." Given the
cultural, political, and historical importance of both individual libAId.

65 Id. See also id.
at 622 ("An individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the

government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected from interference
by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort tomnrd those ends were not
also guaranteed.") (citing Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley.
454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981)); Linder, supra note 58, at 1887 ("Although the word 'association' appears nowhere in the first amendment... a right to associate has long been recognized as necObviously,
essary to safeguard those activities specifically protected by the first amendment ....
neither political parties nor organized religion could flourish without association.).
Wfflliam P. Marshall has argued that the Court should consider a third associational freedom - "the right of cultural association." NWilliam P. Marshall, Disaririnationand the Right of
Assodation, 81 Nw. U. L REV. 68, 84-91 (1986). Although Marshall does not sharply define this
right, he describes it as "[the right to associate along lines of national origin, race, or religious
affiliation...." Id.at 85. It is likely, however, that this right, as described by Marshall, is already protected by the rights of intimate and expressive association. & eg., Rchts, 468 U.S. at
618-19 (intimate associations "play[] a critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation by
cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby foster diversity and act as
critical buffers between the individual and the power of the State.") (citations omitted); id. at
622 (expressive associational freedom "is especially important in preserving political and cutural diversity and in shielding dissident expression from suppression by the majority.- Thus, the
Court protects the right to associate "in pursuit of... political, social, economic, educational.
reli ius, and cultural ends.").
See Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 621 (1984).
Id at 622 ("In view of the various protected activities in which the Jaycees engages...
[the] right [of expressive association] is plainly implicated in this case."). Specifically, the Court
found that the organization took public positions on political issues and engaged in civic. charitable, lobbying, fundraising, and other ...FirstAmendment [expression].' Id at 627.
6sId at 623 ("There can be no ciearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure or
affairs of an association than a regulation that forces the group to accept members it does not
desire ....Freedom of association therefore plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.").
69 See id. at 623-29.
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erty (based on traditional liberalism) and group equality (a response
to a history of group oppression) in the American social and political
culture, Justice Brennan's careful approach provides a useful model
for addressing conflicts between speech and equality in other contexts, such as gay and lesbian liberation efforts." Douglas Linder
correctly views the speech-equality conflict in Roberts as part of a
greater tension between "egalitarian, rights-oriented liberalism,"
which seeks a "neutral" legal framework through antidiscrimination
measures, and "communitarianism," which distrusts concentrating
power within the state for fear of eroding community traditions and
autonomy." This dichotomy, however, is not as "clean" as Linder
presents it. Oppressed "communities," for example, may desire
greaterstate power (e.g., welfare or antidiscrimination laws) to secure
both individual liberty and community autonomy in response to a
history of "private" (and state) subjugation." Nevertheless, only a
multilayered approach to expressive freedoms - one that resists
treating these classical liberal rights as "absolute" - can ensure the
achievement of the important social goal of equality. 3 Accordingly,
under First Amendment doctrine, restrictions on the right of expressive association must be justified by policies that pursue "compelling
state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be
achieved through
means significantly less restrictive of associational
74
freedoms."

The equality interest prevailed in Roberts. Indeed, although the
Court formulated and employed a "balancing" test in order to preserve the competing speech and equality interests, the Court suggested that the antidiscrimination interest might always prevail in
such instances - at least in the specific context of publicly provided

70

See generally William N. Eskridge, A Jurisprudenceof "Coming Out": Religion, Homosexuality, and

Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALEL J. 2411 (1997) (arguing for a
balanced approach to gay and lesbian jurisprudence that accommodates competing liberty and
equality interests).
71 Linder, supranote
58, at 1882.
See, e.g., Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation
and
Legitimation in AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1357 (1988) ("[Lliberal legal
ideology... perform [s] an important function in combating the experience of being excluded
and oppressed."); PATRICIAJ. WILLIAMS, The Pain of Word Bondage, in THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND
RIGHTS 153 (1991) ("For the historically disempowered, the conferring of rights is symbolic of
all the denied aspects of their humanity- rights imply a respect that places one in the referential
range of self and others, that elevates one's status from human body to social being.").
, See genera!y Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Hate Speech: Consideringthe
Victim's Story,
87 MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989). This approach is also consistent with First Amendment jurisprudence. See Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (The right to associate for
expressive purposes is not ... absolute."). See also Matsuda, supra at 2354-55 (discussing several
categorical limitations on speech in First Amendmentjurisprudence).
7 Roberts, 468 U.S. at
623.
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goods and services7 5 The Court thus viewed the state interest in the
public accommodations context as particularly heavy, holding that
the goal of eliminating discrimination in the provision of goods and
services, "serves compelling state interests of the highest order." '
Applying this standard to the facts in Roberts, the Court found that
the organization failed to demonstrate how its political advocacy
would change if women became full members of the organization.
The Court also noted that any abridgment of the Jaycees' seech
rights resulting from the inclusion of women was "incidental." The
Court applied the Roberts test in two subsequent opinions, in each of
which the state's compelling goal of equality prevailed over the defendant's asserted expressive interest.'s Thus, the Roberts formulation
became the doctrinal test for resolving conflicts between antidiscrimination statutes and a discriminator's expressive associational
freedom.
C. The (In)Applicationof Roberts in Hurley
The trial court in Hurley followed the Roberts doctrine and, like
the Roberts court, emphasized public access to goods and services
over the asserted speech interests of the parade organizers. In fact,
the trial court found that the parade had no expressive interests,
given the parade's lack of admission criteria and the plethora of
groups participating." Having made this important factual finding,
the trial court's emphasis on equality over speech was inevitable.
On appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court, the defendant framed
its defense in terms of free speech, rather than expressive association
- arguing that the parade itself was speech." Nevertheless, because
the court accepted the trial court's finding that the parade lacked
any expressive purpose,"' defendant's free speech defense also failed,
and plaintiff again prevailed. Justice Nolan, however, wrote a vigor75See id.
at 628 (stating that "acts of invidious discrimination in thte distnbutin ofpubliey available goods, services, and other advantages.... [l]ike violence or other types of potentially expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their communicati%e impact... are entitled to no constitutional protection.") (emphasis added) (citing Run)n v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160,175-76 (1976)).
76 Id. at 624. See also Marshall, supranote 65, at 77.
Robert, 468 U.S. at 626-29.
See Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 537 (1987)
(holding that the prohibition of gender discrimination by membership organization does not
violate First Amendment); New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York. 487 U.S. 1, 1
(1988) (rejecting facial challenge, on First Amendment grounds, to civil rights statute).
SeeIrish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston v. Boston, 636 N.E.2d 1293,
[I] t is impossible to discern any specific expressive purpose enti1297 (Mass. 1994) [Hurey ] ("'
tling the Parade to protection under the First Amendment ....[T]he [council's) Parade is not
an exercise of their [sic] constitutionally protected right of expressive association. It is an open
') (bracketed text in original).
recreational event .....
soSee id. at 1298.
81
See id.
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ous dissent, arguing that the application of the statute would indeed
violate defendant's right of free speech. Justice Nolan reasoned that
GLIB's forced inclusion in the parade would amount to "compelled
speech" because it would require defendant to admit individuals with
an unwanted message.82
Although the Roberts trilogy played a central role in shaping the
state court rulings in Hurley, these cases had virtually no significance
in the Supreme Court proceedingss Roberts was absent from the Supreme Court's decision because the Court decided the case on free
speech rather than expressive association grounds. Yet, because the
state courts decided that the parade was a place of public accommodation under state law, the Court was bound by this conclusion,8 and
5
should have applied the Roberts decisional law.
The Court first endeavored to identify the protectable speech
dimensions of the parade. It began its analysis of the speech interests implicated in the case by discussing the nature of parades. The
Court distinguished "parades" from a mere "procession" in which
marchers simply wish to "make [a] trip without expressing any message beyond the fact of the march itself.""6 It argued that parades, in
contrast to such meaningless processions, "'are public dramas of social relations, and in them performers define who can be a social actor and what subjects and ideas are available for communication and
See id. at 1302 (Nolan, J., dissenting) ("To compel the Veterans Council to express
GLIB's
message is not narrowly tailored to the State's interest."); id. at 1304 ("[m]andating mere association in this case may be constitutional; mandating a message is not.").
83 See Eskridge, supra note 70, at 2458 ("Doctrinally, the queerest
feature of [Hurley] is the
way the Court's governing precedent, Roberts, disappeared into a legal closet."); Gretchen Van
Ness, Paradesand Preudice: The Incredible True Story of Boston's St. Patrick'sDay Paradeand the United
States Supreme Court, 30 NEW ENG. L. REV. 625, 627 (1996) ("While the Supreme Court chose to
cast [Hurley] as a straightforward First Amendment dispute, it was tried in the state courts primarily as a public accommodations case.").
84 Normally, the Court has no jurisdiction to disturb state court interpretations
of state law.
See RIcHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIELJ. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 521-65 (4th ed. 1996). The Court, however, was
justified in conducting an independent review of the state courts' factual findings. See Bose
Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) ("[Iln cases raising
First Amendment issues we have repeatedly held that an appellate court has an obligation to
'make an independent examination of the whole record' in order to make sure that 'the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.'") (quoting New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-86 (1964)); Niemotko v. Maryland, 840 U.S. 268,
271 (1951) ("In cases in which there is a claim of denial of rights under the Federal Constitution, this Court is not bound by the conclusions of lower courts, but will re-examine the evidentiary basis on which those conclusions are founded.") (citing Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315
(1951).
See Eskridge supra note 70, at 2458 (arguing that the Court was "stuck with
the state determination of the [public accommodations] issue, because the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to review state court constructions of state law") (citing FALLON, supra note 84, at 521-65).
86 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston,
515 U.S. 557, 568
(1995).
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consideration.'"87 The Court then linked parades to its precedents
finding protected speech interests in "protest marches"" and in
other acts of expressive conductfL Resting on this anecdotal, "sociological," and doctrinal discussion, the Court concluded that
"[p]arades are thus a form of expression, notjust motion .... "
Applying this principle to the Boston parade, the Court located
expressive activity in the spectators lining the street, the marchers
adorned in costumes and uniforms along with the banners they
carry, the music of the various bands, and the television broadcast of
the event.9' Accordingly, the Justices firmly rejected the state courts'
conclusion that the parade lacked expressive interests because it had
no selection criteria and had a multitude of participants. The Court
held that "a private speaker does not forfeit constitutional protection
simply by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their
themes to isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject matter of
the speech."2 After noting that speech interests inhere to the selection of material for cable programming,"5 the presentation of a
newspaper opinion page," and the selection of a paid noncommercial advertisement for inclusion in a newspaper, the Court concluded that the organizers' decision to exclude (or include) a unit
from (or in) the parade is entitled to similar First Amendment protection.
The Court's conclusion that the parade was free expression is
susceptible to several points of criticism. First, the Court failed to
engage in an adequate and comprehensive review of the entire factual record below. In particular, the Court raced through or ignored
portions of the state court record which strongly suggested the parade should be considered a place of public accommodation - al-

i87. (quoting S. DAVIS, PARADES AND POWEP.: STREET THEATER IN NINETrEE%nt-CEruY
PHILADEU'HIA 6 (1986)).
See id. at 568-69 (discussing Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) (holding that peacefl protest march falls within sphere of Frst Amendment actihity); Edtrds v. South Carolina.
372 U.S. 229 (1963) (holding that the march of"pride and protest," which included singing and
the carrying of banners, was protected by the First Amendment)).
8See
Id. at 569 (citing West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943)) (saluting a flag and refusing to do so); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969) (wearing an armband to protest war); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (displaying a red flag); National Socialist Party of America v.
Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (displaying swastikas during procession)).
93 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568.
9, See id at 569-70.
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569-70
(1995).
9See id. at 570 (citing Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 521 U.S. 622. 636
(1994)).
See i&. (citing fiami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,258 (1974)).
95 See i. (citing New York 7imes 376 U.S. at 265-66).
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beit one with possible speech interests - rather than speech alone."
Instead, the Court created an almost per se rule, which deems parades
"speech" as a matter of law. The Court also ignored important distinctions between the Boston parade and the examples of expressive
conduct in the precedents it discussed. For example, one could easily distinguish a "protest march," the name of which signifies an expressive purpose, from the Boston parade, which the state courts
found did not have any particular message.98 By evading these important issues which problemized defendant's speech defense, the
Court was able to avoid engaging in the difficult balancing of speech
and equality.9 In Hurley, once the parade and GLIB's participation
in it were deemed speech, the equality interest diminished in importance; the application of the Massachusetts statute could then be
seen as coercing the defendant to speak, thereby unconstitutionally
depriving the parade organizers (as speakers) of the autonomy to determine the content of their speech (the parade). '°
The Hurley Court's conclusion that GLIB's planned participation
in the parade was speech is also vulnerable to criticism, but to a
lesser degree. The Court addressed this issue in a relatively brief
fashion. It held that:
GLIB was formed for the very purpose of marching in [the parade], as
the trial court found, in order to celebrate its members' identities as
openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual descendants of the Irish immigrants, to
show that there are such individuals in the community, and to support

9For
instance, the Court rather hastily rejected the state courts' determination that the
parade lacked an expressive purpose, and it failed to inquire into the factual underpinnings of
that decision. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569 ("To be sure, we agree with the state courts that in
spite of excluding some applicants, the Council is rather lenient in admitting participants.
But.... ."). See also Eskridge, supra note 70, at 2460 ("The evidence of [communitarian] expression in the Boston parade case not only was mighty thin, but was rejected by the finder of
fact."); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Parades,Public Squares and Voucher Payments: Problems of Government
Neutrality, 28 CONN. L. REv. 243, 250 (1996) (characterizing Court's treatment of the parade as
speech as "an exercise in postmodera semio-tics").
See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568 ("Parades are thus a form of expression, not just motion,
and
the inherent expressiveness of marching to make a point explains our cases involving protest
marches."); id. at 569 ("Not many marches, then, are beyond the realm of expressive parades,
and the South Boston celebration is not one of them.").
98 See infra text accompanying notes 167-82 (discussing
distinctions between Boston parade
and expressive conduct at issue in precedent upon which the Court relies).
99 Van Ness, supra note 83, at 658 (arguing that the Court "turned away"
from the "painful"
analysis of competing speech and equality issues); Elliot M. Mincberg, The Supreme Court and the
First
Amendment: The 1994-95 Term, 13 N.Y.L. ScH.J. HUM. RTs. 223, 276 (1997) ("[B]y focusing
on the threshold issue of whether the parade was an expressive activity, the Court avoided such
a potentially difficult issue as whether the public accommodations law provided the basis for a
compelling state interest justifying infringement of First Amendment rights.") (citation omitted).
100
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 572-74
(1995).
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in the New York pathe like
0 men and women who sought to march
rade.1 1
The Court's description of GLIB's purposes indicates that the
group formed in order to transmit certain messages in the parade or as the Court stated - to "communicate its ideas as part of the existing parade, rather than staging one of its own."'* Gretchen Van
Ness, an attorney for GLIB, has argued that this ruling conflates
GLIB's purposes for forming with the organization's purposes for
103
As Van Ness observes, the state courts' inmarching in the parade.
terpretation of GLIB's purposes does not blur the group's reasons
for marching with its reasons for forming, as does Justice Souter's
opinion.1°4 The Court could have viewed GLIB's expressive interests
as a membership organization separately from its participation in the
parade. Nevertheless, given the combative political history between
GLIB and the parade organizers, it seems that the interesting distinction Van Ness raises is, at best, subtle.
As a concluding matter, the Court assessed the state's interest in
altering the message of the parade. Because the Court had found
that both the parade and GLIB's participation in the parade were
forms of expressive conduct, the speech interest of the organizers
The Court
easily outweighed the state's interest in equality."'
framed the issue simply as one of compelled speech. It reasoned
that the application of the antidiscrimination statute in this case
would mean that "any contingent of protected individuals with a
message would have the right to participate in petitioner's" speech,
so that the communication produced by the private organizers would
be shaped by all those protected by the law who wished to join in
with some expressive demonstration of their own."'' Thus, the statute, as applied under the Court's theory of the case, violated a fun-

101Id. at 570 (emphasis added).
102 1&
103

Van Ness, supra note 83, at 627-29.

104

Specifically, the state courts found that

GLIB was formed to march in the annual St. Patrick's Day-Evacuation Day Parade held in
South Boston. GLIB's purposes are to express its members' pride in their dual identities
as Irish or Irish-American persons who are also homosexual or bisexual. to demonstrate
to the Irish-American community and to the gay, lesbian, and bisexual community the diversity within those respective communities, and to show support for the Irish-.American
homosexual and bisexual men and women in New York City who were seeking to participate in that city's St. Patrick's Day Parade.
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston v. Boston, 636 N.E.2d 1293, 1295
(Mass. 1994) [Hurley 1] (internal citation omitted).
105 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 568-72
(1995) (stating that the case "boils down to the choice of a speaker not to propound a particular
point of view, and that choice is presumed to lie beyond the government's power to control.").
106 I&

at 573.
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the right to

D. Examining the Hurley Aftermath
Although the Hurley decision does not apply the Roberts doctrine,
the decision nevertheless raises an important question regarding the
Roberts line of jurisprudence: does the Court's opinion signal a potential weakening of the Roberts doctrine? In the final passages of
Hurley, the Court briefly considered whether the outcome of the case
would differ under the Roberts doctrine. 8 The Court held that it
would not: "[Under the Roberts doctrine,] GLIB could nonetheless be
refused admission as an expressive contingent with its own message
just as readily as a private club could exclude an applicant whose
manifest views were at odds with a position taken by the club's existing members."1°9 The Court's view that private clubs can exclude applicants whose "positions" conflict with those of the existing members is fairly consistent with the test articulated in the Roberts line of
cases. Yet, unlike the Hurley Court, the Roberts trilogy of cases closely
scrutinized the expressive purposes of the organization in order to
determine whether the forced inclusion of a protected class of individuals would substantially burden any clearly-defined expressive
goals of a discriminating organization. This aspect of the Roberts test
led the state courts to conclude that the parade had no particular
expressive goals that would be infringed by GLIB's participation.
Because nearly everyone who sought to participate in the parade was
allowed to do so, the lower courts found that the parade had no explicit expressive goals; thus, the inclusion of an openly gay contingent would not burden the group's freedom of expressive association. The Supreme Court, however, took a more lenient approach to
the question of the parade's expressive goals. It held that "a narrow,
succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional
protection... .0 Under this less stringent rule, the parade organizers were not required to demonstrate why the admission of the protected class of individuals would complicate or burden any specific
expressive purpose or that the parade even had a particular message.
Accordingly, the Court's suggestion that the result in Hurley would
not differ under the Roberts doctrine raises the question of whether
the Court would apply a more lenient approach when assessing
107

Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) ("The right to speak and the right to refrain

from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of 'individual freedom
of mind.'") (quoting Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)).
108 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 580-81 (considering outcome
of case under Roberts and New York State
Club Ass'n).
109 Id.
10Id at 569 (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974) (per
curiam)).
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speech interests in the public accommodations context... The next
section of this article argues that Hurley should not lead to an erosion of the Roberts framework because the case rests on a problematic
theoretical foundation and because the weakening of Roberts would
unduly frustrate state antidiscrimination efforts.
A second question raised in Hurley concerns the Court's treatment of the issue of whether the exclusion of GLIB constituted invidious discrimination. The state courts determined that the parade
organizers engaged in unlawful discrimination when they denied
GLIB's request to participate in the parade. This conclusion seems
highly plausible, given the organizers' shifting explanations for
GLIB's exclusion and the (othervise) almost "open" admissions policy with respect to participation in the parade. "2 The Supreme
Court, however, treated the issue differendy; it cast the group's exclusion as the rejection of unwanted speech, not as discrimination.
Under this view, the Court concluded that the parade organizers:
disclaim[ed] any intent to exclude homosexuals as sud, and no individual member of GLIB claims to have been excluded from parading as a
member of any group that the Council has approved to march. Instead,
the disagreement goes to the admission of GLIB as its own parade unit
carrying its own banner. m

Because the Court credited the defendant's argument that it did not
intend to discriminate against gays, lesbians, and bisexuals, but
rather simply wished to prevent them from carrying a banner, the
Court found that the antidiscrimination statute was applied in a "peculiar" manner: to alter the content of the parade's speech." '
The Court, however, in its resolution of the question of impermissible discrimination by the parade organizers, failed to address
many important issues. First, the Court did not consider whether defendant's refusal to allow GLIB to "carry its own banner' could have
been a pretext for discrimination. In addition, the Court did not examine whether GLIB members had other meaningful opportunities
to participate in the parade (rather than as a single unit); it just assumed that they could have marched in the other units. Most significant, however, is the Court's distinction between carrying a banner and simply being gay in the parade. This distinction reinforced
the silencing of gays and lesbians. The Court's ruling implied that
discrimination against non-heterosexuals is permissible if it only tari See Kristine IML
Zalesls, Note, Pride, Pnjudice or Political Correcnms? An Ana~sis of Hurky v.
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group ofBoston, 29 COLUM.J.L & SOC. PRODS. 507,547-48
(questioning whether Hurley indicates withering of the Roberts doctrine).
112 SeeIrish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston v. Boston, 636 N.F_2d 1293.
1300 (Mass. 1994) [Hurley 1].
n1 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 572
(1995) (emphasis added).
114

See id. at 572-73.
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gets openness - or the placing of sexuality on a "banner." Thus, the
Court seems unwilling to accommodate "outness" or to view the rejection of outness (and the openly gay) as a form of sexual orientation discrimination.
The final part of this article explores this aspect of the Court's
decision in greater detail and, by discussing the important role of
outness as an instrument of sexual equality and identity construction, argues that the Court's vision in Hurley perpetuates the marginalization of gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and the transgendered.
III. ROBERTS REMAINS UNSCATHED
A. Hurley'sDiscussion of Roberts Is Simply Dictum
An easy response to the question of whether the Hurley decision
alters the Roberts framework for analyzing speech-equality conflicts
would note that the discussion of Roberts in Hurley is simply dictum
and as such, has no precedential value in determining future Robertstype cases." 5 Even dicta, however, may be "respected," if not followed, by courts in subsequent cases. 6 Indeed, in the few postHurley cases that have considered speech-equality conflicts in public
accommodations and other antidiscrimination contexts, courts have
distinguished the facts of Hurley rather than rejecting its analysis outright. These courts have considered Hurley relevant on the issue of
whether application of various antidiscrimination statutes would alter the message of the discriminator so as to render the statutes unconstitutional as applied. Despite the emergence of Hurley in these
cases, the courts generally have preserved the Roberts strict analysis of
the defendants' expressive goals, rather than employing the more
lenient test formulated in Hurley.
In Elks Lodges 719 & 2021 v. Alcohol Beverage Control,"7 for example, the Supreme Court of Utah ruled that application of the Utah
Civil Rights Act18 would not infringe plaintiffs' right of expressive association."' Plaintiffs, various Elks and Moose lodges in Utah, challenged (in a consolidated appeal) defendant's revocation of their licenses to sell liquor. Defendant suspended the licenses after the
clubs failed to comply with a prior decision of the Utah Supreme
1 See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 398 (1 Wheat.) (1821) ("It is a maxim,
not to be
disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the
case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected,
but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit, when the very point is presented
for decision.").
116
1

See id.

905 P.2d 1189 (Utah 1995).

118UTAH CODE ANN.
11

§§ 3-7-1 to 13-7-4 (1996).

See Elks Lodges, 905 P.2d at 1200.
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Court, in which the court held that the state's public accommodations statute applied to Elks Lodges (despite their "private" status).""
The Elks Lodges discriminated against women in their admissions
policies. 12 When plaintiffs continued to deny admission to women,
defendant notified them that it would revoke their liquor licenses
unless they ceased their discriminatory practices.In After defendant
revoked the licenses, plaintiffs initiated a lawsuit, arguing that the
suspension of their licenses for failure to admit women as full members violated their rights of expressive and intimate association. * 3 Although the intimate association defense dominated much of the
court's review of plaintiffs' associational rights, the court considered
and rejected24 the expressive association defense using the Roberts
framework.
Further, the court specifically held that Hurley did not complicate
its decision. The court distinguished Hurley on the grounds that
Hurley (purportedly)ss did not involve a question of protected
groups participating in the parade but instead turned on the admission of GLIB as a unit with a banner. Unlike Hurey, the court reasoned, the Elks Lodges case did not concern a clash over unwanted
speech but involved a "decision to wholly exclude an entire class of
society from participation." 2 6 The court then applied Roberts and
concluded that the club's expressive goals would not be impaired by
the admission of women.'2
The Second Circuit provided a more nuanced analysis of the Hurley/Roberts interplay in Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free School District No. 3.123
Although Hsu did not involve a conflict between a public accommodations statute and the First Amendment, it nevertheless illustrates
how courts might preserve the vitality of Roberts while recognizing the
speech concerns the Court expressed in Hurley. In Hsu, a group of
12 See iUL
at 1191-92 (citing Beynon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge 1743. 854 P. 2d 513 (Utah
1993)).
121SSee
S6i5±
12 See id. at 1191-92.
123 SeeElks Lodges 719 & 2021 v. Alcohol Beverage Control, 905 P.2d 1189, 1193 (Utah 1995).

The intimate association defense is not relevant to this discussion.
124 Seei at 1197.
1 The equivocation reiterates my belief that the Huriq court failed to consider the parade
organizer's reason for excluding GLIB as a pretext for invidious discrimination.
122 Elks Lodges, 905 P.2d at 1196.
127 See i&t at 1197 n.7 ("[Bly arguing that women are already allowed access to the clubs' activities and therefore not discriminated against, the clubs cannot also maintain that they desire
to exclude women for intimate or political purposes.") (citing Ro&7is, 468 U.S. at 627). For an
additional example of a case "respecting" but distinguishing Hur/ey. see Warfield v. Peninsula
Golf & Country Club, 896 P.2d 776, 797 n.12 (Cal. 1995) (applying California civil rights statute
to private golf club and concluding that "[b]ecause the application of (the statute] ... vuill have
no appreciable effect on the club members' freedom of expressive association. [Huky] ... provides no support for the club's constitutional claim.").
123 85 F.3d 839 (2d Cir. 1996).
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public school students who wished to form an after-school bible
study group sued the school under the Equal Access Act' 9 after the
school denied them official recognition. The Equal Access Act provides that public school students who wish to form such groups have
the same right to meet in school facilities as other extracurricular
groups.'" The school denied the group recognition because the
group's charter provided that only "Christians" could hold leadership positions in the group. 3 ' The school contended that the exclusionary provision violated the school's antidiscrimination policy that
forbids discrimination on the basis of religion. 1 2 The students, arguing that the school's denial of recognition violated their rights of
free speech and association guaranteed by the Equal Access Act,
sought a preliminary injunction ordering the school to recognize the
group. The Second Circuit concluded that the Christian-only provision was essential to the group's expressive purposes and to the
preservation of its identity.
Plaintiffs' associational rights in Hsu were decided on statutory,
rather than constitutional grounds. m The Equal Access Act provides
that public schools receiving federal financial assistance may not
"discriminate against... students who wish to conduct a meeting...
on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the speech at such meetings."'35 Despite the statutory nature
of the rights implicated in Hsu, the Second Circuit, nevertheless,
drew upon the reasoning of both Hurley
16 and the Roberts line of cases
to assess the students' speech interests.
In Hsu, the circuit court first turned to the plaintiffs' contention
that application of the school's antidiscrimination policy violated
their free speech rights. In examining this claim, the court recognized that Hurley found that a group's message often "depends upon
its ability to exclude certain people, and that this exclusion may be
protected by the First Amendment."'3 7 The Hsu court, however, carefully tailored its reading of Hurley and limited that case to its specific
20 U.S.C. § 4071-74 (1990).
M See Hsu, 85 F.3d at 847.
'31 See iaL
at 848.
13 See id
"' See
id.
1 See Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 3, 85 F.3d 839,
856-59 (2d Cir. 1996).
1 20 U.S.C. § 4071
(a).
1% See Hsu, 85 F.3d at 856 ("Hurley does not control this case, because... it concerns
speech
rights under the Constitution, not a federal statute ....
Despite [this] ...difference, Hurley
remains instructive."); id. at 858 ("Roberts and Rotary... are analytically distinct from this case,
because they involve constitutional rights, not statutory ones. Nevertheless.. . they assist our
interpretation of the term 'speech' in the Equal Access Act."). The court relied upon constitutional law to construe the statute because the legislative history and case law under the act provided the court with "scant authority." Id at 854.
137Id.at 856.
1
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facts (as determined by the Supreme Court), leaving open the possibility for a different outcome under another set of facts. For example, the court stated that "[t]he lesson we draw from Hurley is that
the principle of 'speaker's autonomy' gives a speaker the right, in
some circumstances, to prevent certain groups from contributing to
the speaker's speech, if the groups' contribution would alter the
speaker's message." 3 The Second Circuit thus concluded that the
logic of Hurley would control its decision only "to the extent that
there is an integral connection between the exclusionary leadership
policy and the 'religious speech' at the meetings.""' The Hsu holding maintained the more stringent speech analysis formulated in the
Roberts line of cases. Applying the principles of these cases, the circuit court found that the discriminatory policy was likely defensible
with resect to the upper, but not lower, leadership positions of the
group. Specifically, the Hsu court held that the group's exclusionary policy probably furthered its expressive purposes with respect to
the club President, Vice-President, and the Music Coordinator because these particular officers were responsible for conducting certain Christian prayers and devotions and for safeguarding the "spiritual content" of the group's meetings."' In reaching its conclusion,
the Hsu court exhibited a great degree of sensitivity to the religious
group's expressive interests. For instance, the court squarely refuted
the school's argument that allowing plaintiffs to discriminate on the
basis of religion would grant them "special rights."" The school
contended that "since the Chess Club may not limit its officers to
Muslims, even if its founding members trust only Muslims to lead
them, then [plaintiffs' group] may not limit its officers to Christians."143 The court correctly viewed this analogy as misplaced, concluding that:
because [the club and its] purpose are religious and sectarian, the requisite level of commitment and belief is quite naturally expressed in terms
of religious belief. Equal treatment should mean that the [group] enjoys
the same latitude that other clubs may have in determining who is qualified to lead the Club. Thus, just as a secular club may protect its character by restricting eligibility for leadership to those who show themselves
committed to the cause, [plaintiffs] may protect their ability to hold
Christian Bible meetings by including the leadership provision in the
club's constitution.!

*s I. (emphasis added).
139 Id.at 857 (emphasis added).
140 See Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 3. 85 F.Sd 839, 858 (2d Cir. 1996).
141 S
142 See id. at 860.
14 Id.
'4 Id. at 860-61.
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Thus, the court was particularly sensitive to the club's speech and
associational interests. The court, however, also respected the goals
of equality and concluded that the policy with respect to the remaining officers furthered no legitimate expressive goal of the group."'
In Hsu, the Second Circuit, like the court in Elks Clubs, considered
the Supreme Court's analysis in Hurley16 but preserved the Roberts requirement that discriminatory policies of a private organization must
relate to a particularexpressive interest of the organization in order
to sustain an expressive association defense against the application
47
of a state antidiscrimination statute.
Defendants in cases of alleged sexual orientation discrimination
have also invoked Hurley in order to persuade courts and civil rights
enforcement agencies that the decision erodes the Roberts requirement that a discriminatory practice can only support a defense of
expressive association if it relates to a specific expressive goal of the
discriminating party. For example, in Dale v. Boy Scouts of America,"'
a former Assistant Scoutmaster sued the Boy Scouts of America and
one of its local chapters ("Boy Scouts") when they expelled him after
a news article reported his participation in a college panel on gay
and lesbian youth suicide. 4 9 Boy Scouts contended that application
of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, which precludes discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation, would infringe its freedom of expressive and intimate
association.'
The trial court found that application of the statute
would infringe Boy Scouts' speech rights."" Despite the lack of any
discussion of homosexuality in the numerous handbooks utilized by
Boy Scouts and the lack of any relationship between sexuality and
the recreational activities of scouting, the trial court concluded
that the forced inclusion of a "publicly avowed active homosexual" 5 '
in the Boy Scouts "would be devastating to the essential nature" of
the organization. 5 4 The court construed the various oaths that youth
members of the Boy Scouts memorize as evidence of the organization's stand against homosexuality. Particularly, the court held that
the requirement that youth members be "morally straight" and
145 See i at 857-58.
146 See Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 3, 85 F.3d
839, 856-58 (2d Cir. 1996).

See id. at 859.
MON-C-330-92, slip op. at 4-5 (N.J. Oh. Nov. 3, 1995) [hereinafter
Dale slip op.].
149I, along with several other attorneys
at the New York office of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen and
Hamilton, served as plaintiff's counsel.
15 See Brief for Defendants-Respondents
at 28-34, Dale (No. A-2427-95T3).
1 See Dale, slip op., supra note
148, at 70-71.
12 See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 12-13,
Dale (No. A-2427-95T3); but see Brief for Defendants-Respondents at 14-17, Dale (No. A-2427-95T3) (arguing that Boy Scout handbooks clearly,
albeit indirectly, articulate a policy against homosexual leaders).
153 See Dale, slip op., supra note
148, at 71.
I Id. at 70.
147

148No.
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"dean" demonstrates that the organization's expressive goals include
the condemnation of homosexuality. 5 The Dale court, like the Hurley Court, failed to see the Boy Scouts' policy as one of invidious discrimination unrelated to any expressive goal. For instance, despite
the Boy Scouts' position that it expels gay men from leadership positions because it has as an expressive goal the condemnation of homosexuality, the organization does not expel heterosexuals who publicly criticize the discriminatory policy and who support gay and
lesbian equality.'6 The disparate treatment of gay men and heterosexuals further evidences the Boy Scouts' discriminatory motive.
Hurley did not influence the lower court proceedings in Dale because the case was fully briefed prior to the opinion in Hurley. On
appeal, however, defendants contended that Hurley controlled the
analysis of their right of expressive association! 7 Defendants first attempted to overcome the evidence that their numerous publications
and manuals which outline the mission of scouting do not contain
5
To further
any statements about the immorality of homosexuality.
which
in
Hurley
this strategy, the Boy Scouts relied upon the holding
all
characterize
not
concluded that a succinct message need
159
(free
speech. Plaintiff responded by distinguishing Hurley on legal
speech versus expressive association) and factual (exclusion of a
message versus exclusion of a person) grounds."" Plaintiffs appeal
remains pending.
B. The Soundness of Post-HurleyAnalyses
Although the Hurley court forcefully rejected the notion that expressive interests need a clear articulation in order to receive First
Amendment protection, courts confronted with speech-equality conflicts in the post-Hurley world have continued to adhere to the teachings of Roberts, finding that the First Amendment shields only those
discriminatory practices related to a demonstrable expressive pur-

15 see id.
15 See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 71, Dae (No. A-2427-95T3). See aLso Carol Ness, Pdaluzra
Boy Scout, 12, Says Gays Aferit Indusion, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 15, 1998, at A-8 (reporting political
efforts of twelve-year-old heterosexual scout to reverse Boy Scouts' anti.gay policy. the youth
remains a member of scouting).
15 See Brief for Defendants-Respondents at 28-34, Dale (No. A-2427-95T3).
15sSee id at 14-17 (discussing the language of Boy Scout materials which purportedly condemns homosexuality).
159 See id.at 24 ("The [Hurey] Court began by dispelling the notion that a group's mesage
must be single-minded and direct in order to be protected. The Court observed that 'a narrow,
succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection.') (quoting Hurley
v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,569 (1995)).
160 See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 65 n.14, Dale (No. A.2427.95T3).
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pose. ' By recognizing Hurley, yet preserving the strength of Roberts,
these courts are developing a sound constitutional approach.
1. The Hurley Court Wrongly Departed From Roberts'Articulable
Message Requirement.
Post-Hurley courts are correct in limiting Hurley's reach because
the case stands on a fractured theoretical ground. The Hurley Court,
as discussed above, narrowly reviewed the factual record, failed to
discuss possible distinctions between the Boston parade, other parades, and other forms of expressive conduct, and incautiously credited defendant's statement that GLIB's exclusion was based on the
group members carrying a "banner" (not their sexual orientation),
thereby refusing to construe the exclusion as discriminatory.6 2 For
these reasons alone, courts should use restraint when applying Hurley
in other factual settings.'63 In addition, courts should exercise particular caution when considering the applicability of Hurley' relaxed
standard for assessing the expressive interests of a discriminator because that standard is also intellectually flawed. Recall that in Hurley
the Court criticized the state courts for concluding that the parade
lacked an explicit expressive interest that would be burdened by
GLIB's participation in the parade.'6" The state courts made this
finding because the record established that the parade was large and
unselective and did not have a particular theme - other than the
commemoration of Evacuation Day and St. Patrick's Day. Thus, the
state courts, adhering to Roberts, concluded that the inclusion of
GLIB in the parade would not burden any expressive activities of the
parade organizers.65 The Supreme Court rejected this analysis and
held that "a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition
of constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a 'particularized message' would never reach the unquestionably
shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg,
orJabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll."'6 To support this expansive
definition of speech, the Court cites to precedent involving expres-

161 See supra text accompanying notes 117-47 (discussing Elks Lodges
719 & 2021 v. Alcohol
Beverage Control, 905 P.2d 1189 (Utah 1995); Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 3, 85
F.3d 839 (2d Cir. 1996)).
162 See supra text accompanying notes 96-114 (discussing
doctrinal flaws in Hurley, 515 U.S. 557
(1994)).
163 See Eskridge, supra note 70, at 2463 ("My reading might make too little of Hurley, but the
anaftical problems with its reasoning suggest that it is a precedent to be applied cautiously.").
See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,
569-70 (1995).
163 See Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston
v. Boston, 636 N.E. 2d 1293,
1299 (1994) [Hurley I] (upholding the trial court's finding that the parade lacked a specific messaqeas not being clearly erroneous).
See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569 (internal citation omitted).
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sive conduct and claims that "some" of these cases prove its proposition.'67
These precedents, however, weigh against, rather than support,
the Court's relaxed view of expressive conduct. In West rrginiaBd. of
Educ., for example, the Court held unconstitutional a school's requirement that students salute the flag and recite the "pledge of allegiance"1 6s The Court found that students had a constitutional
right to resist compliance with the salute on First Amendment
grounds. Contrary to the representation of the Hurley court, the
Court in West Virginia Bd. Of Edu. did not find that the salute and
the refusal to salute constitute amorphous, inarticulable expression.
Rather, the Court characterized the salute requirement as a "shortcut" substitute for the "slow and easily neglected route to aroused
loyalties"'69 emerging from instruction in history and civics. The
school board resolution that enacted the requirement also identifies
the clear expressive purposes behind the salute; the resolution describes the re quirement as a ritual "honoring the Nation represented
by the Flag."" That the requirement and refusal to comply both
represented clearly-defined speech interests was demonstrated in the
resolution's warning for the noncompliant: "refusal to salute the Flag
[shall] be regarded as an Act of insubordination, and shall be dealt
with accordingly."17 ' The speech interests of the plaintiffs were also
equally articulated. The plaintiffs, a group of Jehovah's Witnesses,
traced their opposition to the salute to biblical teachings and religThey refused to participate in the salute because
ious practice.
Accordingly, the speech
they viewed the flag as a "graven image."
interests in this case were clearly defined; thus, this case complicates
the Hurley court's expansive standard.
The remaining cases invoked by the Court are equally insupportable of its proposition. In Tinker, the Court invalidated a public
school regulation that forbade students from wearing black armbands to school.'7 4 The Court found that the policy infringed the
16 See id. (discussing West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359 (1931), and National Socialist Party of America v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977)).
16 See West IrginiaB&ofEdun, 319 U.S. at 642.
19 Id. at 631.
17D See id. at 626. The Court held that the
state:
employ[ed] a flag as a symbol of adherence to government as presently organized. It requires the individual to communicate by word and sign his acceptance of the political
ideas it thus bespeaks. Objection to this form of communication when coerced is an old
one, well known to the framers of the Bill of Rights.
Id. at 633.
171 Id.at 626.
172 See id. at 629.
173 Id. (citing Exodus 20:
4-5).
1 SeeTmkerv. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,514 (1969).
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students' First Amendment rights because they chose to wear the
armbands in order to "publicize their ob)jections to the hostilities in
Vietnam and their support for a truce."' The Court thus charged
the school with punishing the "expression of one particular opinion.' 6 Similarly, in Stromberg, the Court held unconstitutional a Cali77
fornia statute that made it a felony to display publicly a "red flag.'
The speech interests of the petitioner who was convicted under the
statute were both "succinct" and clear. Petitioner was a member of
the Young Communist League.' 78 At a camp sponsored by the or79
ganization, petitioner displayed a reproduction of the Soviet flag.
In connection with the display of the flag, petitioner led the participants in a salute to "the worker's red flag, and to the cause for which
it stands; one aim throughout our lives, freedom for the working
class." 's Therefore, petitioner's display of the flag was indisputably
connected to her proven adherence to communist political thought.
Finally, in the Skokie case, the Court reversed an order prohibiting
petitioners from:
[m] arching, walking or parading in the uniform of the National Socialist

Party of America; [n] arching, walking or parading or otherwise displaying the swastika on or off their person; [d]istributing pamphlets or displaying any materials which incite or promote hatred against persons of
Jewish faith or ancestry or hatred against persons of any faith or ancestry,
race or religion.1

This order clearly sought to deter a particular expression - antiJewish bigotry. In sum, none of the precedent cited by the Court in
Hurley supports its relaxed rule regarding the expressive nature of
conduct.' 2 Ironically, the Court's own "finding" that parades consist
of "performers [who] define... what subjects and ideas are available
for communication and consideration," 83 conflicts with its lenient
formulation. Because the Court's lax rule stands on weak intellec-

"17 Id.

at 504.
Id. at 511 (emphasis added) (noting that the wearing of black armbands
to protest the
Vietnam War was singled out for punishment while other forms of symbolic speech were not).
17 Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-70
(1931).
176

18

Id. at 362.

179 Id.
ISO Id.

181 National Socialist Party of America v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 43 (1977).
18
The Court also mentions Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) and Edwards v.South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) as examples of expressive conduct. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 568 (1995). It is unclear whether the
Court intended to include them as examples of speech conveying an inarticulable message. In
any event, the speech interests in these cases are also strongly defined; both cases involved
1960's marches by blacks to protest racial discrimination. See Gregory, 395 U.S. at 111; Edwards,
372 U.S. at 230.
183Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568 (emphasis added) (quoting S. DAvis, PARADES AND POWER:
STREET

THEATER IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY PHILADELPHIA 6 (1986)).
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tual and doctrinal grounds, lower courts should continue limiting its
reach.
2. Places of Public Accommodation Are Not "Speech."
Assuming the Court was correct in identifying the parade as pure
expression - albeit with an amorphous message - rather than as a
place of public accommodation, the Hurley analysis should be limited
to this fact and therefore should not control cases in which the public accommodations question is not at issue. Unless courts follow the
Roberts doctrine's strict analysis of the speech interests that discriminating places of public accommodation claim to hold, the First
Amendment will begin to shield an unprecedented amount of discrimination from state regulation.'8'
Consider the Dale case in which the Boy Scouts claims that it has
On apan expressive goal the condemnation of homosexuality."
peal, Boy Scouts argued that "the [defendant] in Hurley was not required to propound any particularly good reason for excluding the
participants with whose views they were in disagreement."' ' The Boy
Scouts invoked this ruling in order to counter the lack of evidence
demonstrating that the members of the organization come together
to express animosity towards gay men. Thus, the Boy Scouts argued
that any "organization engaged in expressive activity is entitled to exclude unwanted messages even if its own expressive message does not directly address the subject matter of the unwanted message."'" This standard,
supportable under a moderate reading of Hurly, would erect an almost insurmountable barrier to state antidiscrimination efforts.' A
discriminating organization would simply have to demonstrate that it
engages in "some" inarticulable, vague expression, and that this
murky expression would "somehow" be disturbed by the admission
of members of a protected class.
Courts can prevent this expansion of the right to discriminate by
limiting Hurley to pure "free speech," rather than "expressive association" cases. In a free speech case, where the subject matter is "pure
speech," it seems clear that a state action that affects the content of
the speech might burden the speaker's First Amendment rights.
184 Accord Runyon v. McCrary, 427 US. 160, 176 (1975)
('[I]nidious private discrimination
may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First

Amendment ... [but] it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections.").
15 See discussion supra Part III. A.

186Brief for Defendants-Respondents, Dale No. MON-C-330-92 (NJ. Super. CL Ch. Div. Nov.
3, 1995).
187 Id at 25 (emphasis added). See also i& at 31 ("The First Amendment does not require that
Scouting become a noisy political opponent of homosexual rights for its expression to be protected) (citation omitted).

188SeeVan Ness, supranote 83, at 660 (characterizing the "implications" of a strict application
of Hurley as "staggering").
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The expressive interests in cases that involve traditional places of
public accommodation or membership organizations, on the other
hand, are less obvious. Imagine, for example, that a restaurant denies service to a group of people of color. The same restaurant,
however, routinely serves whites and never denies them service. It is
an extremely popular restaurant, but people of color are consistently
refused service. When confronted with a civil rights lawsuit, the restaurant alleges that enforcement of a public accommodations statute
that prohibits racial discrimination would infringe upon its right of
expressive association. The restaurant cites Hurley for the proposition that while its white supremacist message is subtle, amorphous,
and hidden, it nevertheless exists. The restaurant says that by permitting people of color to dine on its premises, it would be compelled to convey a message to the public that dining with people of
color is acceptable. Because dining is not typically considered a form
of expressive conduct,' 8" it is not clear how enforcement of the statute would burden the restaurant's expressive rights. Accordingly, a
court in this situation should rigorously examine the defendant restaurant's claim in order to determine whether the enforcement of
the statute would actually burden its asserted expressive interests.
The Roberts framework provides for this exacting analysis; Hurley does
not. Because the Hurley analysis rests on pure speech rather than associational grounds, it should not control the ordinary Roberts-type
cases involving discrimination in places of public accommodation,
which lack any obvious speech interests and which typically involve
expressive association, rather than free speech, defenses.
3. Restoration of Balance.
Finally, courts should limit the reach of Hurley in order to maintain the balanced approach to speech-equality conflicts established
by the Roberts doctrine. As the Roberts trilogy and the discussion in
Hsu and Elks Lodges demonstrate, courts can respect both the tradition of free speech and group equality that are inextricably woven
into our legal and political cultures. The Hurley court retreated from
this delicate balancing. By restricting Hurley's holding to the particular "facts" of that case, courts can again turn to the important, yet
difficult, task of weighing the social goal of individual freedom
against the interest in a society free of group oppression.

189 Of course, the cessation of dining for the purpose
of protesting - a "hunger strike" has taken on an expressive meaning. Thus dining itself could arguably assume expressive meaning in certain contexts.
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IV. TOWARD THE ACCOMMODATION OF OUTNESS IN
ANTIDISCRIMIfNATION LAW AND LEGAL THEORY

A. Hurley: Reinforcing the Closet
The Hurley Court reversed the state courts' finding that the parade organizers denied GLIB's request to participate in the parade
solely on the basis of sexual orientation. The state courts specifically
noted the organizers' shifting excuses for refusing GLIB's numerous
requests to participate in the parade as evidence of unla'fful discrimination. The Supreme Court, however, reduced the issue to
speech: GLIB's exclusion occurred because organizers did not want
to hear the group speak.' The Court's conclusion that GLIB's exclusion did not constitute unlawful discrimination is questionable on
several grounds.
First, the Court failed to engage the state courts' determination
that the defendant's reason for excluding GLIB was pretextual. It is
highly plausible that the organizers, given their history of presenting
new justifications for GLIB's exclusion, were not completely forthcoming with respect to their true intentions in their argument before the Supreme Court. Furthermore, because the issue of the organizer's credibility is best determined in the trial courts, the
Supreme Court should have taken greater care before disturbing this
important factual issue.
Even if we assume the Court was correct in treating GLIB's participation in the parade as speech, this fact does not eliminate the
possible disparate impact that the exclusion of this speech had upon
gay, lesbian, and bisexual participation in the parade. By excluding
GLIB's "speech" - or all speech relating to homosexuality - from
the parade, the organizers may have effectively excluded any participation by non-heterosexuals in the parade. This disproportionate effect of the organizer's action could either prove or support a claim of
discrimination and undermine the veracity of the organizers' compelled speech defense. 9' Furthermore, even if gays, lesbians, and bisexuals marched in groups other than GLIB's, this fact alone does
not preclude discrimination against members of GLIB based solely
on their sexual orientation. Generally, the fact that some members
See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 575.
BROOKS, CARRASCO, & MARTIN, CIVIL RIGHTS LMGATION: CASES AND PERSPECrES 447
(1995) (discussing disparate impact theory in civil rights actions). Although no published Massachusetts decisions apply a disparate impact theory in the public accommodations context, no
cases preclude the application of this theory in such litigation. This issue has been litigated in
at least two states. See Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, 805 P.2d 873, 893 (Cal. 1991)
(treating disparate impact as evidence of discriminatory intent in actions against places of public
accommodation); Paper v. Rent-A-Wreck, 463 N.W. 2d 298, 300 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (disparate impact may prove prima facie case of discrimination in places of public accommodation).
19

11See

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 1: 1

of a protected class do not face discrimination does not negate a
claim of discrimination by other individuals within that same class. 9 '
The most troublesome aspect of the Court's dismissal of GLIB's
allegation of discrimination, however, is the way in which it severely
devalues the important role that speech plays in the construction of
sexual identity and the achievement of gay and lesbian equality.
Public declarations of sexual identity such as GLIB's are inextricably
linked with gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered status and political equality. Thus, defendant's exclusion of GLIB's message subordinated non-heterosexual status. By legitimizing defendant's action as a permissible choice not to speak, the Court relegated
"outness" back into its metaphorical closet. In order to explain more
fully the negative impact of the Court's decision on gay rights efforts,
I will discuss the significance of coming out as it relates to gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered identity and politics.
B. The Social Construction of Identity
1. General Framework
Historically, social identity categories such as race and sex have
been treated as having a fixed, biological and genetic existence. Today, however, a growing number of scholars now understand these
categories to be products of social construction. Influenced by
postmodernist thought, science, and sociology, writers such as Ian F.
Haney Lopez have persuasively argued that social identity categories
are products of "fabrication," rather than nature.'93 Lopez, for example catalogues scientific literature that refutes the common perception that races are genetically distinct.19 Finding no credible scientific definition of race, Lopez traces its meaning to social
relations: "Race must be viewed as a social construction. That is,
human interaction rather than natural differentiation must be seen
as the source and continued basis for racial categorization."'n9 Lopez
identifies four important facets of "racial fabrication": (1) humans,
not abstract forces, produce race; (2) races are an integral part of a
multidimensional social fabric that includes gender and class; (3) racial meanings change quickly; and (4) races are constructed "rela19

See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 452-56 (1982) (Tide VII context).

193 See Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on
Illusion, Fabrca-

tion, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (1994).
1%See id. at 11 ("There are no genetic characteristics possessed by all Blacks but not by nonBlacks; similarly, there is no gene or cluster of genes common to all Whites but not to nonWhites.") (citing R. C. LEWONTIN ET AL., NOT IN OUR GENES: BIOLOGY, IDEOLOGY, AND HUMAN
NATURE (1984); AlanJ. Almquist &John E. Cronin, Fact,Fancy, and Myth on Human Evolution, 29
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 520 (1988); Bruce Bower, Race Fallsfrom Grace, 140 Sa. NEWs 380
(1991)).
195 Lopez, supra note 193, at 27 (referring to PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS
LuCKIAN, TIE
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALrY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1966)).
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tionally," in opposition to one another. ' 9 Although Lopez attributes
race to social interaction, he nevertheless appropriately recognizes
the role that morphological features have in the construction and
maintenance of racial categories and racial power.H Lopez also does
not allow the socially constructed nature of race to obscure its tangible - and material - significance. 8
In addition to distributing social, political and economic power,
race also serves to design - or construct - communities, which in
turn help define individual identity. Race shapes communities as
the social relevance of a shared morphological trait "provid[es] a
common experience to people who earlier or in a different context
may not have seen themselves as similar."'9 Communities influence
personal identity because individuals often define themselves in relation to a social group to which they see themselves as belonging. " 0
Thus, social race becomes a powerful component in the construction
of personal identity.
2. Sexuality and Social Construction.
Lopez's analysis provides a useful lens for considering the construction of identity. Although Lopez focuses almost exclusively on
race in his article, he acknowledges the importance of viewing race as
merely one component of the social fabric that shapes community
and individual identity.2uI Yet Lopez's analysis does not significantly
engage the relationship between race and these other social identity
categories. t This factor, however, does not greatly detract from the
usefulness of Lopez's discussion.

196 See U

at 28.
[Lopez] define[s] a 'race' as a vast group of people loosely bound together by historically contingent, socially significant elements of their morphology and/or ancestry. [He]
argue[s] that race must be understood as a sui genris social phenomenon in which contested systems of meaning serve as the connections between physical features, races, and
personal characteristics. In other words, social meanings connect our faces to our souls.
Id.at 7.
1 See id at 61 ("The absence of any physical basis to race does not entail the conclusion that
race is wholly an hallucination. Race has its genesis and maintains its %igorousstrength in the
realm of social beliefs.").
199 Id. at 55.
See id.
at 57 ("Communities form a core source of personal identity and proside a crucial
base from which to interact with the larger society. The culture shared across a community
(citing R'VJO
lends 'significance to human experience by selecting from and organizing it.-)
ROSALDO, CULTURE AND TRUTH: THE REMAKING OFSOCIALANALSIS 26 (1989)).
201See i& at 60 ("The multiplicity of community allegiances each of us holds adds still more
confounding intricacies to the connection between our morphology and personality. Each of us
shares multiple allegiances across many different axes, like class, sexual orientation, and gender.").
2 The heaviest docket of literature on the multilayered nature of social identity and
the interlocking relationship between various systems of oppression is proided by feminist and
antiracist scholarship on the impact of racism and patriarchy in the lives of women of color. For
1
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The social construction of sexual identity has also been explored
by commentators in the gay and lesbian context.20 3 Like Lopez,
many of these scholars acknowledge the multidimensionality of sexual identity but do not engage its particularities. Again, this omission does not diminish the tremendous insights these works provide,
but it may mask the racially constituted nature of sexual subordination.2 04 A younger body of scholarship, however, considers the relationship between race, racism, sexuality, and heterosexism. 25" This
newer body of scholarship, other writings by gay and lesbian scholars,
and Lopez's framework, supply the theoretical mechanism through
which the following discussion of the socially constructed nature of
sexual identity will occur. By considering the racial (and other)
components of identity concurrently, this analysis furthers
an ongo26
ing project that illuminates the complexity of identity.
Janet Halley offers one of the most thorough discussions of the
social construction of sexual identity within legal theory.2°7 As Halley's analysis reveals, both pro-gay and anti-gay activists have debated
the issue of whether sexual identity is biologically determined or a
product of social interaction. 208 Halley, however, directs her arguments primarily to activists concerned with gay and lesbian equality,
attempting to find a "middle ground" between the constructivista recent anthology of leading literature in this field see CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997).
203 See, e.g.,Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A
Critique of the Argument
from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503 (1994).
2" See generally Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra note 14, at 583-635
(arguing that gay and
lesbian legal theorists and political activists fail
to consider the implications of racial hierarchy in
their work).
05 See id. at 562-63
n.9.
See id. at 636-44 (urging gay and lesbian legal theorists and political activists to recognize
"multidimensionality" of oppression and identity). See also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Claiming
and Speaking Who We Are: Black Gays and Lesbians, Racial Politics, and the Million Man March, in
INSIDE RACE (Devon Carbado ed., forthcoming 1998) . By focusing, in part, on the writings of
gay and lesbian people of color, I do not wish to imply that white gays and lesbians do not possess a race or that their sexual identities are somehow less complex. As I have previously argued, my theory of"multidimensionality [attempts to] capture ...the inherent complexity and
irreversibly multilayered nature of everyones identities and of oppression." Hutchinson, Out Yet
Unseen, supra note 14, at 641 (emphasis in original). Furthermore, recent scholarship analyzes
the social construction of whiteness in order to refute the common association of "race" with
"people of color" and to reveal the existence and meaning of whiteness. See, e.g., CRITCAL
WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEYOND THE MIRROR (Richard Delgado &Jean Stefancic eds., 1997).
M See generally Halley supra note 203.
See Halley, supra note 203, at 517 (categorizing essentialists and constructivists as "pro-gay"
and "anti-gay"). Anti-gay essentialists believe that homosexual orientation is "fixed, immutable,
and normatively bad or sick", id.;
pro-gay essentialists believe that homosexual orientation is
fixed and immutable and, therefore, should be protected from discrimination, see id.; anti-gay
constructivists believe that homosexual orientation is mutable and that discrimination can help
move gays and lesbians away from homosexuality, see id.; pro-gay constructivists contend that all
forms of sexuality are mutable and that "social policy on sexual orientation should not impede
these variations," id.
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essentialist debate in gay and lesbian politics and legal theory. This
debate has recently received growing attention due to the publication of several scientific studies that purport to "prove" the biological
nature of homosexualitye as well as the advancement of immutability arguments by litigants claiming that sexual orientation classifications should receive heightened scrutiny under equal protection
principles.
Although Halley seeks to locate a compromise position between

pro-gay essentialists and social constructivists, 21' her intellectual and
political sensitivities dearly lie within the constructivist camp. Halley
criticizes the essentialism proponents on several grounds. First, Halley questions the legitimacy of scientific claims that homosexuality is
biologically based. Halley also challenges the doctrinal characterization of homosexual identity as biologically determined and immu2
" Litigants have advanced these
table in equal protection litigation..
essentialist arguments in their attempt to persuade courts to apply
heightened scrutiny to governmental classifications based on sexual
orientation, arguing that because sexual orientation is an "immutable" characteristic, the state should not discriminate against individuals on this basis.21 4 The development of immutability-based arguments in gay and lesbian equal protection litigation and civil
rights scholarship responds to language in the Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Frontierov. Riclardson,1 ' which concluded that strict
scrutiny should apply to sex-based discrimination.2, In Frontiero,the
Court based its application of heightened scrutiny on a number 2of
reasons: the "long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination," 1 7
the highly visible nature of the "sex characteristic,"2 8 and the fact
that sex is an "immutable characteristic determined solely by the ac-

cident of birth."21 9 Yet, as Halley observes, immutability serves merely
as a factor- not a requirement - in the determination of whether a
2M

at 521-23, 52946 (discussingJ. Michael Bailey & Richard C. Pilland. A GeneticSludy of
See id.

Ma/e Sexual Orientation,48 ARCHIVES GEN. PSicHIARY 1089 (1991) and Simon LeVo). A Differnee
in H) pothalamic StrutureBetween Heterosexualand Homosexual Men, 253 SCILE 1034 (1991)).
210See i& at 507-16.
211 Halley locates this compromise position in 'weak beha.ioral constructiism." See td.
at 56062. Under a weak behavioral constructivist approach, sexual preferences are essential, possibly
fixed, but vary across the social landscape. See i4 at 558 ("'Weak behavioral constructhism acknowledges the powerful reality of sexual-orientation categories as we know them, but posits
that some other form or forms of human v.ariance are primary. It thus challenges us to imagine
beyond the sexual-orientation categories homo- and heterosexual.").
212 See i&at 530-45.
213 See i& at 507-16.
214 i& at 507, n.7.
215 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion).
216 See Halley, supranote 203, at 507.
217 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
218 Id. at 686.
219 Id. at 686. See also Halley, supra note 203, at 507.
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particular classification is "suspect" for equal protection purposes.220
Thus, the employment of immutability arguments by gay and lesbian
civil rights litigants rests upon flawed doctrinal grounds.
The treatment of homosexual identity as a fixed, biological characteristic also distorts the social reality of sexual identity. Although
many gay men and lesbians have stated that they believe they were
"born" as gay or lesbian individuals, scores of others view their sexual
orientation as contingent, variable, and chosen. 22 Among the latter
are bisexuals who feel constrained by dichotomous labels such as
"gay" and "heterosexual," and other individuals who believe that biological accounts of sexuality ignore the political and social processes
around which their identities are (or were) produced. 3 Thus, essentialist definitions of homosexual identity obscure differences among
gays and lesbians and mask the political and social components of
non-heterosexual identity. A closer examination of the "coming out"
process helps to illuminate the social and political elements of sexuality.
3. Coming Out and Sexual Identity
Due to societal homophobia and heterosexism, which act in tandem with patriarchy, white supremacy, and class stratification,224 gay
and lesbian experience is often shrouded in secrecy; the "closet" has
become the prevailing cultural metaphor to symbolize the invisibility
of gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered individuals. Although
the closet may serve to insulate gay and lesbian people from direct
discrimination, violence, and emotional abuse, it nevertheless poses
tremendous psychological and political costs upon gay and lesbian
communities and individuals.ss Furthermore, the harms caused by
life "in" the closet negatively affect other marginalized communities
MSee Halley, supra note 203, at 507-10. See also Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d
1329, 1347 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The Supreme Court has
never held that only classes with immutable traits can be deemed suspect.") (citing Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 442 n.10 (1985) (casting doubt on immutability theory);
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (same); San Antonio Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (same)).
2 The immutability argument is also subject to criticism
for not questioning the legitimacy of
society's stigmatization of homosexuality. Rather than demanding a justification for heterosexist practices, proponents of immutability/essentialism instead assert that such practices are morally wrong because their victims cannot change their status (the implication being that if nonheterosexuals can change their sexual identity, they should). See Halley, supranote 203, at 524.
22 See Halley, supra note 203, at 526-28.
23 See id.
24 See Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra
note 14 at 604.
M SeeJane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283, 299 (1994) ("Far from the innocuous safe haven pictured
by opponents of gay rights, the closet exacts a high price in self-esteem, emotional health, and
access to the community."); Eskridge, supra note 70 at 2442 ("The closet is a temptingly safe
hiding place, but it forecloses psychological, social, and political opportunities.").
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with which gays and lesbians are associated -communities of color
and feminist communities. Racial, gender and class hierarchies in
gay and lesbian communities, however, may actually add some tremendous costs to the coming out process for people of color.
Perhaps the greatest negative effect the closet has on individual
gays and lesbians is to their emotional and psychological well-being.
A plethora of psychological data has documented the debilitating
impact that "internalized homophobia" - or the acceptance of societal homophobia by gay and lesbian people - has upon an individual's self-esteem, personal development, and emotional adjustment.2e The closet harms gay communities because it hinders the
ability of gays and lesbians to engage in collective political action to
achieve equality.27 Furthermore, as numerous scholars have argued,
homophobia and gay and lesbian invisibility also divide communities
of color and feminist communities, erecting barriers to social and
political action in these social groups as well.' Similarly, racial, class
and gender hierarchies also divide gay communities. 2 9 As a result of
these collective and personal harms caused by the closet, heterosexism, and internalized homophobia, coming out has become a crucial
instrument in the formation of gay and lesbian identity, communities, and politics (and in anti-racist and feminist communities and
politics). These identities are multidimensional and are composed
of racial, gender, and class layers. The GLIB conflict, for example,
did not simply concern homophobia, as it is typically assumed; rather
the dispute involved a challenge, by GLIB, over narrow, essentialist,
and heterosexist constructions of Irish-American ("white ethnic")
identity.2"
226 See

Eskridge supra note 70 at 2442 (citation omitted). Se also Gregory M. Herek. Myths
About Sexual Orieniatioa : A Lawyer's Guide to Social Science RasarA 1 L & SEXLuIY 133. 145-46
(1991) ("lesbians and gay men probably maintain self esteem most effectively when they identify
with and are integrated into the larger lesbian and gay community.").
See genera/y,JanetE. Halley, The Politicsof the Close. Towards EqualProtectionfor Gay, L bian,
and BiseMual Identiy. 36 UCIA L REV. 915 (1989). See also Eskridge supra note 70 at 2443 ("The
closet.., disabled gay people from forming social and political groups.").
We4 &g., Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra note 14 (discussing how homophobia and the
closet impede black political action and promotes racist acts against black gays and lesbians);
Patricia A. Cain, Feministj"isudenrz Grounding te Theori 4 BEm-. WoMENt'S LJ.191 (19891990) (arguing that homophobia and the marginalization of lesbians by feminists harm feminist
theory and divide women).
See Hutchinson, Out Yet Unsen, supra note 14 at 605-08.
Similar contestations have occurred in communities of color. Scejungwon Kim, India Day
Dispute" CelebrationParadeBans Gay-Rights Mardie NEWSDAY,Aug. 13, 1997, at AS (reporting
exclusion of Asian-American gay, lesbian and bisexual group from New York City's India Day
Parade); Teresa Wiltz, Black Gays, Lesbians Begin to Fight Bath, CHIC. TRiB., Aug. 15, 1993. at Cl
(reporting dispute over participation of black gay and lesbian group in Bud Billiken parade, a
celebration in Chicago's South Side). Nevertheless, although it is popularly believed that communities of color are exceedingly more homophobic than the general population, many ga)s
and lesbians of color have, after political activism, gained the opportunity to participate in these

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 1: 1

Public self-identification plays an important role in the formation
of complex social identities. In her work on lesbian theory, Shane
Phelan's insightful analysis of the coming out process illustrates its
importance to gay and lesbian identity. Phelan complicates the traditional, almost exclusive, understanding of coming out as an act of
"revelation, an acknowledgment of a previously hidden truth. 3'I Instead, Phelan seeks to understand coming out as a process of identity
construction.
Drawing on postsmodernist thought, Phelan, like Lopez and Halley, views personal identity as a product of human interaction, history and political forces.ns While Phelan concedes that gayness and
lesbianism exist as "real" and tangible entities, she attributes their
meanings not to nature, but to an intricate process of human interaction and political processes.23 If we conceive of identity as a process, Phelan argues, then coming out of the closet no longer entails a
decision simply to make one's identity public; instead, it is a crucial
part of becoming gay or lesbian:
If we think of identity as a process, the closet changes. Leaving the closet
is not a matter of simple visibility, but is a reconfiguration of the self. It is
a project rather than an event. Becoming lesbian is indeed a process of
resistance to patriarchal heterosexuality. It is not the discovery or revelation of one's resistance but is the resistance itself. Furthermore, this project is never complete. One is never "finally," "truly" a lesbian, but becomes lesbian or not with the choices one makes.
Thus, by coming out, the gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered individual does not merely reveal a hidden identity but is
"fashioninga self... that did not exist before coming out began." 35
Coming out is also a form of political action; it is the resistance to

cultural events. See Terry Wilson, Gay Community Unites to Celebrate Its Pride, CHIC. TRIB., June 6,
1994, at NI (reporting participation of black and Latino groups in several parades hosted by
Chicago's communities of color); Gamalier Dejesus iQuienes Somos? What Is This Thing Called
Identity, VILLAGE VOICE, July 2, 1996, at 27 (reporting that Latino/a gay and lesbian groups have
openly participated in New York City's Puerto Rican Day Parade since 1989); Wiltz, supra (reporting a settlement in the Bud Billiken dispute under which a black gay group was allowed to
participate).
231 See SHANE PHELAN, GETrING SPECIFIC: POSTMODERN LESBIAN PouTics
51 (1994).
232 See generally id. at 41-56.
233 See id. at 52 ("There is in this view a reality, a stable horizon of what it
means to be lesbian
or gay, but that stability is not given by discovery of deep truth but by participating in particular
historical communities and discourses.").
2M Id. at 52.
2 See id. (emphasis added). See also Eskridge supra note 70
at 2440 ("Coming out as lesbian,
gay, or bisexual... [is] no longer understood merely as a discrete personal discovery and expression of one's sexuality, but is now seen as a process of continual discovery and exploration
made possible through liberation from the clich6s of 'compulsory heterosexuality.'") (citation
omitted).
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"patriarchal heterosexuality"' and a challenge to both narrow, heterosexist237constructions of racial identity and white constructions of
gayness.
C. Accommodating Outness in Civil Rights Law
1. Hurley: No Room for Outness.
Because coming out serves as a crucial instrument in the development of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered identities, "outness" has become an inseparable part of gay identity. Hence, policies that discriminate on the basis of outness should be seen as
discriminating on the basis of gay and lesbian identity as well.
The linkage between outness and gay identity, however, escaped
the Court in Hurley. The Court concluded, despite the findings of
the state courts, that the parade organizers did not engage in unlawful discrimination against gays and lesbians "as such" when they excluded GLIB from participating. The Court reasoned that gays, lesbians and bisexuals could participate in other parade units and that
the dispute centered upon the organizers' desire to omit GLIB's particular message from the parade.!GLIB's message (if any), however, was one of outness. By marching in the parade as a distinct, openly gay unit, GLIB could have
celebrated the existence of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals of Irish descent. Indeed, the Court concluded that this was GLIB's very purpose for wanting to march in the parade. Thus, GLIB's outness
would have documented the diversity of Irish-American communities, helped reconstruct essentialist visions of Irish sexuality, and
served as a challenge to the heterosexist practices of the parade organizers - practices that were arguably distinct from the expressive
purpose, if any, of the parade. GLIB's outness, therefore, was part of
the complex process of identity construction, in which gay and lesbian identities are reconfigured beyond the closet and whereby homophobic norms that narrowly demarcate the boundaries of sexualViewed as such, the
ity, gender, race, and class are resisted.2
ns See PHELAN, supra note 231, at 52. See also Halley, supra note 227, at 970-71 ("Public homosexual identity is so volatile, so problematically referential to a history of genital homosexual
conduct, and so relentlessly controversial that it has become an element of political discourse
distinguishable from the conduct that, Hardrekkinforms us, states may constitutionally criminalize.").
See generally Hutchinson supranote 206 (arguing that black gay participation inand refusal
to participate in the Mfillion Man March, given the organizer's homophobic declarations, helped
to challenge hetereosexist constructions of blackness) (emphasis added). Srt aLso GOMEz. supra
note 27, at 169 (Stating that because blackness is constructed as heterosexual and gayness as
white, coming out for blacks entails "saying both I am gay and also declaring I ar stIl Blar.')
(e phasis in original).
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 572
(1995).

2"See PHELAN,

supranote 231.
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organizers' rejection of GLIB's message - its outness - constituted
an act of discrimination based on gay, lesbian and bisexual identity.
Accordingly, the Court's conclusion that the parade organizers did
not engage in sexual orientation discrimination fails to realize the
intricate connection between outness, gay and lesbian identity, and,
more broadly, the socially constituted nature of sexual identity.
2. Making Space for Outness in Civil Rights Jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court's dismissal of GLIB's discrimination claim in
Hurley has the potential to legitimate future acts of discrimination
based on outness in a variety of contexts, including the area of public accommodations. For example, in the Dale case, 4 the Boy Scouts,
relying on Hurley, argued that the organization excludes open or
"avowed homosexuals" from scouting due to their
message - not
their sexual identity: "A known or avowed homosexual causes his exclusion from Scouting by conduct or advocacy, not orientation.
Scouting does not concern itself with homosexuality or sexual orientation per se, but with homosexual conduct or affirmation."24'
This simplistic distinction between outness and sexual orientation completely obfuscates the role that coming out has in the construction of gay, lesbian and bisexual identity. Yet, the severability of
outness from gay identity is supportable under even a constricted
reading of Hurley.42 The doctrinal treatment of outness discrimination as a permissible form of discrimination, one distinct from gay
and lesbian discrimination, would severely complicate gay rights efforts and provide discriminators with a convenient route to avoid
compliance with civil rights regulations.
In order to protect fully gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered
individuals from invidious discrimination, civil rights jurisprudence
must accommodate outness by recognizing that it is a central facet of
gay and lesbian status. Under a legal framework which accommodates outness, discrimination against a publicly identified gay, lesbian or bisexual individual would constitute sexual orientation discrimination, and a discriminator could not defend against claims of
discrimination by characterizing its policy as "anti-out" rather than
anti-gay. 24s By accommodating outness in legal theory, courts and
See supranote 148.
Defendant-Respondents Brief at 16, Dale (A-2427-95T3).
242 The disaggregation of outness from
gay and lesbian identity also informs the Defense Department's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, under which public self-identification by nonheterosexuals subjects them to discharge from the military.
243 This approach has been taken by the
NewJersey legislature in the construction of its civil
rights statute. New Jersey law, which governed the Dale case, prohibits discrimination on the
basis of affectional or sexual orientation in employment, business relations, and places of public
accommodation. The state's definition of the protected class recognizes the importance of public self-identification to sexual identity. Under the NewJersey Civil Rights Statute, affectional or
240
241
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scholars would recognize that coming out does not merely render
visible a secret, fixed identity;, rather, the process constitutes the
formation of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered identity itself.
Because outness is inextricably linked with the construction of gay
and lesbian identity, outness discrimination is a form of gay and lesbian discrimination, which should be penalized under state civil
rights statutes that prohibit sexual orientation discrimination.
V. CONCLUSION

As Hurley indicates, litigation involving claims of discrimination
against gays and lesbians is deeply political. Three justices of the Supreme Court believe that elected officials should enjoy a seemingly
boundless ability to discriminate against gays and lesbians. All nine
justices fail to appreciate or understand the importance of outness
in the struggle for gay and lesbian equality. The political nature of
gay rights litigation also results from the fact that, in such cases,
courts often must weigh a plethora of competing, important social
issues, including the protection of free speech and the goal of social
equality.
The Roberts doctrine provides a useful framework by which to engage in this delicate, often volatile process. In Hurley, the Supreme
Court abandoned the Roberts framework and elevated speech over
equality, not only implying that speech interests outweigh equality
goals, but that equality goals were not even implicated in the defendant's exclusion of the openly gay contingent. By expanding the
scope of expressive conduct and disaggregating outness from sexual
identity, the Court avoided confronting the collision between classical liberal traditions and modem and postmodern notions of equality. Although the Hurley decision arguably calls into question the vitality of Roberts, courts in the post-Hurley context have considered the
Hurley Court's sensitivity to speech but have not abdicated the
speech-equality balancing framework established in Roberts and its
progeny. These courts have rightfully limited the reach of Hurley
and have preserved the wise and fair approach of Roberts.
sexual orientation "means male or female heterosexuality, homosexuality or bisexuality by incli-

nation, practice, identity or expresion, having a history thereof or being perceived, presumed or
identified by others as having such an orientation.' NJ. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-Slhh %est 1998)
(emphasis added). In the area of discrimination by states rather than private actors, scholars
and civil rights attorneys have framed claims of discrimination on both First Amendment and
Equal Protection principles. See Bobbi Bernstein, Power, Prejudiw, and the Right to Spak Litigating
"Outness" Under the Equa Protetion Clause, 47 STAN. L REV. 269 (1995) (discussing protection of
outness under First Amendment and Equal Protection principles). Sre also Halley, supra note
227 (arguing that public expressions of non-heterosexual identity allow gays and lesbians to participate in the political process and should be guarded under Equal Protection principles).
These arguments recognize the expressive nature of coming out, and the linkage between selfidentification and identity construction.
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Courts, however, have not yet considered whether Hurley mandates a distinction between outness and gay identity. Because of the
important role that public self-identification has in the construction
of gay, lesbian and bisexual identities, such a turn in civil rights jurisprudence would be detrimental to gay and lesbian equality. Future contestations will likely determine, at least momentarily, the
precise reach of Hurley, and whether legal theory will (as it should)
recognize that the accommodation of outness in civil rights jurisprudence is essential to the fulfillment of gay and lesbian equality.

